LAWYERING FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE by Heminway, Joan MacLeod
797 
LAWYERING FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
Joan MacLeod Heminway* 
Social enterprises—businesses that exist to generate financial and 
social or environmental benefits—have received significant positive 
public attention in recent years.  However, social enterprise and the 
related concepts of  social entrepreneurship and impact investing are 
neither well defined nor well understood.1  As a result, entrepreneurs, 
investors, intermediaries, and agents, as well as their respective advisors, 
may be operating under different impressions or assumptions about what 
social enterprise is and have different ideas about how to best build and 
manage a sustainable social enterprise business.  
Indeed, the law governing social enterprises also is unclear and 
unpredictable in respects.  In particular, the application of  business 
associations law to specific questions involving social enterprises is 
somewhat unseetled.  This essay identifies two principal areas of  
uncertainty and how they have the capacity to generate lawyering 
challenges and related transaction costs around both entity formation 
and ongoing internal governance questions in social enterprises.  Core to 
the professionalism issues are the professional responsibilities implicated 
in an attorney’s representation of  social enterprise businesses.  
To illuminate legal and professional responsibility issues relevant 
to representing social enterprises, this essay proceeds in four parts.  First, 
using as its touchstone a publicly available categorization system, the 
essay defines and describes types of  social enterprises, outlining three 
distinct business models.  Then, in its following two parts, the essay 
focuses in on two different aspects of  the legal representation of  social 
enterprise businesses: choice of  entity and management decision making.  																																																								*	Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of  Law, The University of  Tennessee College of  
Law.  New York University School of  Law, J.D. 1985; Brown University, A.B. 1982.  I 
am indebted to Eric Amarante for comments he provided on a draft of  this essay.	
1 See, e.g., Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919, 926 (2016) 
(“The term ‘social enterprise’ does not have a precise definition and as such, while 
often used, it is also commonly misunderstood.”); Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, 
What Is A "Social" Business and Why Does the Answer Matter?, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 278, 278–79 (2014) (“Many proponents of  the social enterprise movement 
have attempted to provide more precise definitions of  ‘social entrepreneur’ or ‘social 
enterprise.’ However, definitions in this area remain hopelessly fractured, often 
conflicting, and almost always tautologically utilize the term ‘social.”’); Alicia E. 
Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 223 (2013) 
(“[A]dvocates and actors in the social enterprise sector have not agreed upon a single 
definition of  ‘social enterprise’ and . . . many terms are used to describe the various 
organizational models on the value creation spectrum, including social enterprise, 
triple-bottom line business, and social entrepreneurship.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Finally, reflecting on these two aspects of  representing social enterprises, 
the essay concludes with some general observations about lawyering in 
this specialized business context. 
I. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISES 
As businesses that “do well by doing good,”2 social enterprises 
can come in many forms.  A useful taxonomy is provided by the Social 
Enterprise Alliance,3 which defines social enterprises as “[o]rganizations 
that address a basic unmet need or solve a social or environmental 
problem through a market-driven approach” 4  and categorizes social 
enterprises into three general types based on the nature of  their 
engagement with social or environmental betterment.  These three social 
enterprise models are labeled: “Opportunity Employment,” 
“Transformative Products or Services,” and “Donate Back.”5  Social 
enterprises of  these kinds may be either nonprofit or for-profit firms 
from a state business associations law or federal income tax law 
perspective. 
Opportunity employment social enterprises “employ people who 
have significant barriers to mainstream employment.”6  Borderland Tees 
is a business in Knoxville, Tennessee that exemplifies this type of  social 
enterprise.  It is a t-shirt print shop that employs those needing some 																																																								
2 See, e.g., Shinu Abhi, “Can Social Entrepreneurs Do Well by Doing Good? Blending Social and 
Economic Value Creation”- An Investigation, 23 ACAD. ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. Aug. 2017, at 
1 (defining for-profit social entrepreneurial ventures as “those ventures that blend 
social goals with business goals and referred as ‘double bottom lines organisations’ or 
‘bottom of  the pyramid ventures.’”); Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and 
Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 21 
(2014) [hereinafter McDonnell, Committing] (defining social enterprises as “businesses 
that have dual goals of  making a profit for their investors while also pursuing social 
goods, sometimes narrowly and sometimes broadly defined.”).  Other commentators 
have defined businesses in this space in similar terms.  For example, Professor Dana 
Brakman Reiser uses the term “blended enterprise” to mean an “entity that intends to 
pursue profits and social good both in tandem and by making considered choices to 
pursue one over the other.”  Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual 
Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 105 (2010). 
3  See What is Social Enterprise?, SOC. ENTER. ALL.,https://socialenterprise.us/ 
about/social-enterprise/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
4 Id.; see also Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in 
Social Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 123 (2018) [hereinafter McDonnell, From Duty and 
Disclosure] (“Social enterprises pursue a dual mission, founded to both generate profits 
for their founders and investors while also independently pursuing other social goals.”); 
J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise and Investment Professionals: Sacrificing Financial Interests?, 
40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 765, 767 (2017) (describing social enterprises as “organizations 
that use commercial means to reach social ends”). 
5 See SOC. ENTER. ALL., supra note 4. 
6 Id. 
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social and financial help.  This business model evolved from positive 
outcomes observed in the employment of  a mentally ill homeless man.  
The rest is, as they say, history. 
[W]e realized the power of  this workplace model for 
transformative ministry. So Bob and I decided to open a 
separate print shop specifically for cultivating these 
relationships. We called it Borderland Tees – 
“Borderland” because we wanted to include people on 
the borders or margins of  our society, people who suffer 
from what Mother Teresa called “a poverty of  
relationship.” . . .  We call it “Capitalism for the Common 
Good.” We are not a job-training program, but 
sometimes people find work. We are not a housing 
ministry, but sometimes people find a place to live. We 
are a ministry of  individual relationships, not a program. 
As Bob says, “God is in the retail business, not the 
wholesale business.”7 
Another prominent example mentioned on the Social Enterprise 
Alliance website is Goodwill Industries, which states on its website that 
its local organizations “meet the needs of  all job seekers, including 
programs for youth, seniors, veterans, and people with disabilities, 
criminal backgrounds and other specialized needs.”8 
Social enterprises engaged in providing transformative products 
or services “create social or environmental impact through innovative 
products and services.”9  Knoxville, Tennessee’s Love Kitchen is a classic 
example of  this type of  social enterprise. 
The Love Kitchen provides meals, clothing and 
emergency food packages to homebound, homeless and 
unemployed persons. We work with local agencies to 
provide meals, secure used clothing, and donate services 
in the hope of  promoting the self-sufficiency of  those 
we serve. The organization has no paid staff; all 
donations go to those who need it most. Our ultimate 
goal is to provide nourishment for anyone who is hungry 
																																																								
7 Rev.Jenny Arthur, The Borderland Story, BORDERLAND TEES, https:// 
www.borderlandtees.com/our-story.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).Borderland Tees, 
Our Story, https://www.borderlandtees.com/our-story.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
8 About Us, GOODWILL INDUSTRIES INT’L, INC., https://www.goodwill.org/about-us/ 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
9 SOC. ENTER. ALL., supra note 4. 
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and to establish a community center to serve as a safe 
haven supporting area children and their families.10 
Other social enterprises supplying transformative products or services 
include: Nashville, Tennessee’s Soles4Souls, which (among other things) 
takes donations of  new and used shoes and distributes them to those 
who need them;11 Jared Allen’s Homes for Wounded Warriors, which 
raises funds and in-kind contributions “to build and remodel handicap 
accessible homes to suit the individual needs of  our injured United 
States military veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan”;12 and New 
York’s Safe Passage Project, which provides free legal services to 
immigrant children.13 
Social enterprises organized to donate back “contribute a portion 
of  their profits to nonprofits that address basic unmet needs.”14 These 
include Nashville Tennessee’s Songs Against Slavery, which “empowers 
and inspires communities to join the fight against sex trafficking in the 
United States . . . [by raising] awareness and funds through benefit 
concerts and musician partnerships.”15  A longstanding example of  a 
firm that donates back is Newman’s Own, a food and beverage firm 
founded by actor Paul Newman that donates all of  its profits to 
charitable causes.16 
Businesses of  this kind are complex.  They engage commercial 
enterprise to serve social or environmental aims. They do exist to make 																																																								
10  Welcome to the Love Kitchen, THE LOVE KITCHEN, INC.,  
https://www.thelovekitchen.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
11 See About Us, SOLES4SOULS, https://soles4souls.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2019)  (“Soles4Souls creates sustainable jobs and provides relief  through the 
distribution of  shoes and clothing around the world.”).  Souls4Souls also works with 
micro-enterprise firms in developing countries to support entrepreneurs interested in 
starting shoe businesses—meaning that it also is an employment opportunity social 
enterprise.  See FAQ: What do you do with the shoes you receive?, SOLES4SOULS, 
https://soles4souls.org/faq/.  Other social enterprises also operate in more than one 
type of  social enterprise. 
12 Mission and History: Foundation Mission, JARED ALLEN’S HOMES FOR WOUNDED 
WARRIORS, https://www.homesforwoundedwarriors.com/mission-history/ (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2019). 
13 See About Us: Who We Are, SAFE PASSAGE PROJECT,  
https://www.safepassageproject.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (“We provide 
free lawyers to refugee and immigrant children in the NYC-area who face deportation 
back to life-threatening situations, despite their strong legal claim to stay in the US.”).  
14	SOC. ENTER. ALL., supra note 4	
15 Our Mission, SONGS AGAINST SLAVERY, https://songsagainstslavery.org/about-us/ 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
16 See 100% Profits to Charity, NO LIMIT, LLC, https://www.newmansown.com/100-
percent-profits-to-charity/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).  
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profit, and part of  any profit enures to the advantage of  the firm’s 
intended social or environmental beneficiaries.  The extent to which 
other internal and external constotuents may also derive banafit from 
those profits may depend on the legal form in which the social enterprise 
is organized. 
As a result of  this complexity, lawyers who advise social 
enterprises are best counseled, consistent with that advisory role, to 
understand the nature of  social enterprise in more than just a legal sense.  
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of  Professional Conduct provide 
in relevant part that “[i]n rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to 
law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and 
political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”17  The 
same rules require the legal advisor to “exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice.”18  Given the relative 
complexity of  advising business principals and businesses generally–and 
the additional levels of  decision-making required to represent social 
enterprises–a broad comprehension of  social enterprise and the 
environment in which it operates–drawn from legal and non-legal 
traditions–seems wise, if  not essential. 
II. CHOOSING THE RIGHT BUSINESS ENTITY  
FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISES 
How do social enterprises organize themselves, from a legal 
standpoint?  There are many options.  Each has its advantages and 
disadvantages.  In the current social enterprise environment, specific 
areas of  tension in corporate law compound this general complexity. 
Having said that, it seems wise to start with the general issues in entity 
selection and work our way toward the specific, contentious corporate 
law issues.  Social enterprise entity formation issues test a lawyer’s duty 
of  competence—“legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation”19—in multiple ways. 
Of  course, founders and promoters of  social enterprise can 
remain sole proprietors or, if  desired, form unincorporated business 
associations (i.e., partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited 
partnerships, limited liability companies, or where available, low-profit 
limited liability companies—a specialized form of  limited liability 
company designed for use by social enterprises) or incorporate in one of  
several forms.  New corporate forms have proliferated in the past ten 																																																								
17 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
18 Id. 
19 Id. at r. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
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years, making corporate choices more textured (and, for some, more 
confusing or contentious).  In essence, the traditional choice of  
incorporating as a non-profit corporation or a for-profit corporation has 
expanded to include, in a majority of  states, a third (and sometimes a 
fourth) option to incorporate as one of  several different types of  for-
profit social enterprise corporation.  Accordingly, while the spectrum of  
organizational choices still extends from sole proprietorships through 
unincorporated business associations to nonprofit and for-profit 
corporations, the range of  options in that spectrum has increased. 
This wider variety of  choices makes the lawyer’s task in assisting 
the client more demanding.  In an earlier essay, I noted the challenges 
that alternative entities bring to choice of  entity decisions in general.20  I 
stated there that “[t]he substantial change and complexity presented to 
legal counsel by the introduction of  alternative forms of  business entity 
over the past quarter century test a business lawyer’s ability to exercise 
ethical professional judgment at multiple junctures and in myriad ways.”21  
Add to the evolution and intricacy of  legal rules that I noted in that 
essay both the new corporate law options for organizing social enterprise 
firms and the multi-faceted social enterprise business models described 
in Part I, and the professional stresses mount. 
Although various state laws offer a number of  distinctive, 
specialized social enterprise corporate forms,22 most states offer three 
principal options for the incorporation of  a social enterprise:  a 
conventional non-profit corporation and a traditional for-profit 
corporation, as well as a benefit corporation, a for-profit corporation 
that operates under tailored, narrow management and governance 
constraints geared to a public purpose.23  Under Tennessee law, for 
example, a social enterprise desiring to incorporate may choose to 																																																								
20 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Professional Responsibility in an Age of  Alternative Entities, 
Alternative Finance, and Alternative Facts, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 227 (2017). 
21 Id. at 234; see also Eric H. Franklin, A Rational Approach to Business Entity Choice, 64 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 573, 575 (2016)  (noting the existence of  “an increasingly complex array 
of  business entity options for potential business owners”). 
22 See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 27–28 
(2015) [hereinafter Murray, An Early Report] (noting “the formation 
of  benefit corporations, . . . flexible purpose corporations, general benefit corporations, 
public benefit corporations, social purpose corporations, specific benefit corporations, 
and sustainable business corporations.”). 
23 See, e.g., McDonnell, Committing, supra note 2, at 21 (“Lawyers and legislators have 
begun to invent hybrid legal forms to meet the needs of  these hybrid businesses. The 
most important of  these new forms is the benefit corporation.”); Murray, An Early 
Report, supra note 23, at 28 (avowing, after listing forms of  social enterprise entity, that 
“[t]he benefit corporation form has emerged as the most popular social 
enterprise statute type,”). 
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organize as a non-profit corporation, 24  a traditional for-profit 
corporation,25 or a for-profit benefit corporation.26 Some commentators 
contextualize the benefit corporation (among other social enterprise 
forms of  entity) as a hybrid form of  corporation, inhabiting a place 
somewhere between the customary non-profit and for-profit corporate 
forms.27   
 
This relative positioning of  the benefit corporation form between the 
non-profit and traditional for-profit corporate forms is accurate but 
incomplete.  Indeed, benefit corporations are for-profit corporations 
under both federal tax law and state corporate law (enabling them to 
offer pecuniary gain—a private benefit—to funders through the 
ownership of  an equity interest in the business) with public-facing aims 
like that of  a non-profit corporation.  But it is not quite that simple. 
The core distinctive legal rules governing benefit corporation law 
are novel and unique to the benefit corporation form.  Professor Brett 
																																																								
24 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-51-101 – 48-68-211 (2019). 
25 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-28-101 – 48-28-109 (2019). 
26 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-11-101 – 48-27-103 (2019).  
27 See, e.g., Franklin, supra  note 22, at 582 (observing that “[t]he organizations in the 
hybrid category have experienced remarkable growth in recent years, and include such 
legal forms as benefit corporations . . . .”); John Tyler et al., Producing Better Mileage: 
Advancing the Design and Usefulness of  Hybrid Vehicles for Social Business Ventures, 33 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 237 (2015) (noting the proliferation of  the benefit 
corporation and other social enterprise forms and explaining that “[t]he term ‘hybrid’ 
refers to rules in enabling statutes that blend aspects of  traditional for-profit ventures 
(such as private investors) with characteristics normally associated with traditional non-
profit entities (such as charitable or other social benefit purposes).”); Katherine R. Lofft 
et al., Are Hybrids Really More Efficient? A ‘Drive-by’ Analysis of  Alternative Company 
Structures, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2012, at 1 (referencing “an increasing variety of  new 
models or forms of  so-called ‘hybrid’ business organization, which are intended to 
provide more flexibility, and a measure of  legal protection, to organizations that want 
to ‘do well by doing good.’”). 
Non-profit	Corporation
Benefit	Corporation
Traditional	For-profit	Corporation
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McDonnell succinctly explains the characteristic governance norms in 
benefit corporation law in a recently published article:  
[B]enefit corporations . . . impose fiduciary duty . . . 
requirements. The directors and officers of  a benefit 
corporation must consider the effects of  their actions on 
a variety of  specified interests, including employees, 
customers, the community, the environment, and the 
ability of  the company to generate a general public 
benefit. Shareholders may sue if  they believe a company’s 
directors and officers have violated this duty, although 
their remedies are limited. Nonshareholder constituencies 
(e.g. employees or customers) do not have the right to 
sue to enforce the duty to consider their interests, 
although companies may grant standing by agreement.28 
In most states, benefit corporations also have a state-law filing 
requirement additional to the required filing of  an annual report.  They 
must file a “benefit report.”  “In these reports, companies must say what 
they have done to pursue general public benefit, along with any specific 
public purpose they may have. This must be measured against an 
independent third-party standard . . . .”29  Lawyers offering advice on 
business entity choice must be conversant with and competent in 
advising on these innovative benefit corporation rules as well as the 
formation, structure, governance, financing, and third-party liability rules 
of  conventional non-profit corporations and traditional for-profit 
corporations. 
That general depiction of  a benefit corporation also may 
understate the level of  knowledge required to engage in capable 
representation of  a social enterprise or its constituents.  Of  course, not 
all state non-profit or traditional for-profit corporation laws are the 
same. 30   Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that within the benefit 
corporation form, there also are a number of  different state statutory 
models.31  In other words, different states have adopted different forms 																																																								
28 McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure, supra note 4, at 94–95 (footnotes omitted). 
29 Id. at 95. 
30 See Kelli A. Alces, Legal Diversification, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1977, 2022-23 (2013) 
(“Corporate law presents . . . a law market . . . .  States can choose different corporate 
governance laws and firms can then choose where they want to incorporate.”); Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101, 2131 (2018) “Each state 
assembles and offers a corporate-law package consisting of  a corporation law, a method 
for amending it, a judicial system, and an administrative agency.”). 
31 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. 
Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 616-25 (2017) (offering examples, in the 
text and referenced appendices, of  different state benefit corporation laws) [hereinafter 
Heminway, Corporate Purpose]; McDonnell, Committing, supra note 2, at 30–31 (describing 
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of  benefit corporation, magnifying further the number of  options a 
social entrepreneur or business promoter has for legally organizing a 
social enterprise business.  A business lawyer must understand the 
individual state law similarities and differences in all three types of  
corporation, as well as the similarities and differences in all applicable 
unincorporated business forms in order to offer professionally 
responsible legal advice on entity formation in a social enterprise 
context.  And the lawyer must then be able to use this knowledge in 
context to advise the principals of  the social enterprise in the selection 
of  a business form based on the then available facts. 
Assuming formation and maintenance costs can be managed, the 
lawyer’s contextual analysis typically focuses on three key potential points 
of  difference that may distinguish the reasonable expectations of  
principals of  one social enterprise from those of  another in a way that is 
determinative of  the lawyer’s recommendation on choice of  entity: 
• Entity-level federal and state income tax obligations 
and benefits (which may depend on, e.g., whether the 
social enterprise is anticipated to operate exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational 
purposes, whether the activities of  the social 
enterprise are expected to include influencing 
legislation or participating or intervening in any 
political campaign for or against any candidate for 
public office, and whether the business model 
proposed for the social enterprise incorporates the 
possibility of  paying federal or state taxes on business 
income—all of  which help distinguish a non-profit 
social enterprise exempt from federal and state 
income taxation from an income-tax-paying for-
profit corporate social enterprise);32 
																																																																																																																																		
different benefit corporation statute models: B Lab, Delaware, and Minnesota); J. 
Haskell Murray, Examining Tennessee's For-Profit Benefit Corporation Law, 19 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 325, 328-30 (2017) (outlining two principal statutory 
models and presenting Tennessee’s statute as a third model—and an outlier). 
32 See generally 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2018) (exempting certain specified corporations from 
federal income taxation).  A number of   subsidiary issues are embedded in the federal 
income tax status of  the firm that may affect founder and promoter decisions on the 
choice of  an appropriate legal entity.  See generally Yaniv Heled et. al., Why Healthcare 
Companies Should Be(Come) Benefit Corporations, 60 B.C. L. REV. 73, 120–21 (2019) 
(describing generally attributes of  nonprofit and for-profit corporations that affect 
decisions on a choice of  entity).  For example, the limitations on salaries for executives 
and other employees of  tax-exempt entities, as well as the general restrictions on 
distributions of  corporate assets to employees in tax-exempt firms, may be 
important—or even dispositive. 
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• Benefits available to presumed funders (including 
whether prospective funders may want a tax 
deduction, credit, or other tax benefit or whether 
they may desire to share in the profits of  the venture, 
which would promote or preclude organization of  
the social enterprise as a tax-exempt non-profit 
corporation);33 and 
• Management governance obligations, including 
fiduciary duties (for instance, whether corporate 
directors and officers will expect or require flexibility 
in determining the nature and objectives of  their 
decision making, which provides insights into 
whether the structured decision making and 
management duties of  a benefit corporation may 
make that for-profit corporate form a beneficial 
choice in organizing under an individual state’s 
corporate law).34 
A significant level of  diligence is required to obtain the relevant facts—
information sufficient to perform the required analysis.  “A lawyer shall 
act with reasonable diligence . . . in representing a client.”35   
Yet, even a lawyer who can effectively access and acquire 
accurate and complete information from social enterprise entrepreneurs, 
founders, or promoters relating to these three matters may find it 
difficult to offer definitive advice to social enterprise venturers.  The 
three areas of  inquiry may point in different directions, and while the 
first two areas of  inquiry may offer relatively clear solutions, the vagaries 
of  the law on social enterprise decision-making in the corporate form 
raise particularly thorny choice-of-entity issues.  These legal challenges 
are described in Part III.  
III. ADVISING SOCIAL ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT  
ON DECISION-MAKING 
The business law advisor’s challenge in working with social 
enterprises does not end once the selection of  an appropriate entity has 
been made and the organization of  the firm has been accomplished.  
Lawyers advising social enterprise management on ongoing decision 
making also confront difficult issues, especially when management 
perceives or knows that it must make a relatively stark choice (in an 																																																								
33 See, e.g., id. §§ 170 & 501 (establishing tax deductions for charitable and other 
contributions and gifts and restricting the conferral of  more than incidental private 
benefits on private shareholders or individuals). 
34 See infra Part III. 
35 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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individual circumstance or a series of  circumstances) between generating 
short-term or long-term profit for financial interest holders and serving 
the firm’s social or environmental purpose.  This choice may be 
especially tough for management of  a social enterprise organized as a 
for-profit corporation.   In the for-profit corporate form, legal pressure 
may exist at the intersection of  shareholder wealth maximization and the 
pursuit of  the social enterprise firm’s public social or environmental 
benefit.   
In making decisions involving trade-offs between maximizing the 
financial wealth of  the venture for equity owners and serving the firm’s 
mission, corporate officers and directors in a for-profit social enterprise 
may risk transgressing statutory management mandates or breaching 
their fiduciary duties.36  Even when the law provides some clarity, lawyers 
often must exercise reasoned discretion in helping clients choose from 
among multiple possible approaches or actions. Thus, in a business 
management decision-making context (as in a choice-of-entity context), 
rational legal analyses may not result in clear choices; a lawyer’s 
professional responsibility and professionalism are both tested.  Lawyers 
working with social enterprises in that decision-making context—
perhaps especially those representing social enterprises organized as 
benefit corporations, given theor novel and untested nature—must be 
fully conversant with the evolving applicable law and lore.37  Even a 
lawyer competent in corporate governance must exercise diligence in 
keeping up with current statutory and decisional law, as well as practice 
norms.38 
																																																								
36 See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Let's Not Give Up on Traditional for-Profit 
Corporations for Sustainable Social Enterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 787 (2018) 
[hereinafter Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up] (“The outcome of  any controversy regarding 
the application of  the shareholder wealth maximization norm to management decision-
making for a sustainable social enterprise firm organized as a for-profit corporation is 
likely to be dependent on many factors . . . .”). 
37 The first comment to Rule 1.1 of  the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of  
Professional Conduct readily comes to mind. 
In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge 
and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative 
complexity and specialized nature of  the matter, the lawyer's general 
experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in 
question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the 
matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or 
consult with, a lawyer of  established competence in the field in 
question. 
Id. r. 1.1 cmt. 1. 
38 Id.; see also id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer should . . . take whatever lawful and ethical 
measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.”). 
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The major battleground in the corporate law governing social 
enterprises is the for-profit corporate law regarding the objectives of  the 
decision-making of  the board of  directors and the corporate 
constituents that decision making must and may serve.  Legal 
consternation created by a few judicial opinions (from courts in different 
states issued in a variety of  corporate contextst over a period spanning 
more than 100 years) challenges the nature and focus of  board decision-
making in the traditional for-profit corporation.39  Those opinions may 
be read to require corporate directors to maximize shareholder wealth in 
every decision they make or to impose an overall decision-making norm 
to that effect—a shareholder wealth maximization norm—in all board 
proceedings.40  Numerous books, articles and other papers, and later 
judicial decisions have identified, described, and parsed these opinions 
and various versions of  an ostensible shareholder wealth maximization 
rule or norm.  Despite this extensive commentary, there is not academic 
or practical agreement on the extent to which corporate directors must 
act to maximize shareholder wealth in each decision they make.  It may 
nevertheless be clear, however, that directors must not disregard the 
effects of  their decision-making on shareholder wealth.  
The benefit corporation arose in major part from a desire to 
offer a for-profit corporate form of  entity in which management would 
not be required to maximize shareholder wealth in every decision made.41  
As a result, benefit corporation statutes govern, among other things, 
what a benefit corporation board of  directors must consider or balance 
in its decision making, as well as the nature and objective of  the 
directors’ fiduciary duties. 42   While this black-letter codification of  
management process and duties is designed to be helpful to benefit 
corporation directors and to the legal advisors counseling benefit 
corporation directors on the exercise of  their decision-making 
responsibilities, the benefit is somewhat illusory.  The application of  the 
statutory standards in specific contexts may not be straightforward, and 
the constraints on board decision-making may result in attorneys 
recommending processes that do not improve—and may harm—the 
substantive quality of  the board’s decisions in promoting the mission of  
the social enterprise, exposing the directors to potential liability in 
shareholder litigation. 																																																								
39 See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of  
Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 950–56 
(2017) (identifying and summarizing these court opinions). 
40 See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 22, at 612–15. 
41 See Heminway, Corporate Purpose, supra note 31, at 617 n.24 (2017) 
42 For a more detailed discussion of  these aspects of  benefit corporations, see id. at 
621–25 
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Although the exact standards vary from statute to statute, state 
benefit corporation statutes typically require directors to “consider” or 
“balance” the interests of  specific constituencies and the firm’s public 
benefit in making decisions.43  They also clarify, among other things, the 
lack of  a shareholder wealth maximization norm (or even shareholder 
interest primacy) 44  or that an informed, disinterested director’s 																																																								
43 New Jersey’s law provides an example of  a statute mandating consideration of 
interests: 
The board of  directors . . . shall consider the effects of  any action 
upon: (1) the shareholders of  the benefit corporation; (2) the 
employees and workforce of  the benefit corporation and its 
subsidiaries and suppliers; (3) the interests of  customers as 
beneficiaries of  the general or specific public benefit purposes of  the 
benefit corporation; (4) community and societal considerations, 
including those of  any community in which offices or facilities of  
the benefit corporation or its subsidiaries or suppliers are located; (5) 
the local and global environment; and (6) the short-term and long-
term interests of  the benefit corporation, including benefits that may 
accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term plans and the 
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued 
independence of  the benefit corporation . . . . 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(a) (2011). The Tennessee statute offers another type of  
consideration requirement:   
In discharging the duties of  the position of  director of  a for-profit 
benefit corporation, a director shall consider the effects of  any 
contemplated, proposed, or actual transaction or other conduct on 
the interests of  those materially affected by the corporation's 
conduct, including the pecuniary interests of  shareholders, and the 
public benefit or public benefits identified in its charter . . . . 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-106(a) (2018); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-104(d) 
(2018) (“A for-profit benefit corporation shall be managed in a manner that considers 
the best interests of  those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, including 
the pecuniary interests of  shareholders, and the public benefit or public benefits 
identified in its charter.”).  The New Jersey statute also permits the consideration of  
other matters and factors.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(b) (2018).  The Delaware statute 
requires a balancing of  interests.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2019) (“The board 
of  directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs of  the public benefit 
corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of  the stockholders, the 
best interests of  those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, and the specific 
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of  incorporation.”); see also 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(a) (2018). In New Jersey’s 2018 legislative session, 
a bill was introduced to require both a consideration and balancing of  interests by 
directors in their decision-making. S. 2260, 218th Legis., § 2 (N.J. 2018), available at 
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/S2500/2260_I1.HTM. 
44 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(c) (2003 & Supp. 2018) (“The board of  directors . . . 
shall not be required to give priority to the interests of  any particular person or group 
referred to in subsection a. or subsection b. of  this section over the interests of  any 
other person or group unless the benefit corporation has stated its intention to give 
priority to interests related to a specific public benefit purpose identified in its 
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compliance with the required decision-making standard satisfies the 
director’s applicable fiduciary duties.45   However, the articulation of  
management duties—including fiduciary duties—in the various state 
benefit corporation statutes is far from clear when applied in specific 
decision-making contexts.46 
The statutory duties provide no real guidance as to how 
to measure and balance the effects on different 
interests—they merely list the interests that directors and 
officers must consider. Even if  the legal advisors force 
boards to put in the record that they have considered 
each of  these interests before making a decision, those 
records could easily become pro forma checklists. Case 
law could ultimately provide more detailed and nuanced 
guidance, but so far, there are no cases, and the limited 
chances of  success may mean that the case law never 
develops (as has been the case, for instance, with 
constituency statutes).47 
Unless and until the law further develops, these uncertainties will 
complicate the legal advisory context for lawyers representing social 
enterprises organized as benefit corporaitons. 
For some, the more pointed expression of  management duties in 
benefit corporation statutes represents an undesirable constraint on 
board processes that may impair or impede quality decision-making, 
taken alone or viewed in the overall context of  the statutory scheme.  
Management may rely on facial compliance with the statutory rules as 
both a liability shield and,perhaps mistakenly, a validation of  the 
substantive effect of  their actions. 
																																																																																																																																		
certificate of  incorporation.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-106(a) (2012 & Supp. 2018) 
(“[A] director . . . shall not give regular, presumptive, or permanent priority to the 
interests of  any individual constituency or limited group of  constituencies materially 
affected by the corporation’s conduct, including the pecuniary interests of  
shareholders.”). 
45 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b)	 (2011 & Supp. 2018) (“[W]ith respect to a 
decision implicating the balance requirement in subsection (a) of  this section, [a 
director of  a public benefit corporation] will be deemed to satisfy such director's 
fiduciary duties to stockholders and the corporation if  such director's decision is both 
informed and disinterested and not such that no person of  ordinary, sound judgment 
would approve.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(b) (West 2017). 
46 See McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure, supra note 4, at 96 (“[T]he duty . . . 
requirements leave it quite vague regarding how to measure the impact on the various 
interests, and even more vague as to how companies should balance the impacts on 
differing, and sometimes competing, interests.”). 
47 Id. at 97 (footnote omitted). 
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Directors and officers who want to paint a pretty, green picture 
of  how they are benefiting the planet will probably be able to evade legal 
liability for either violating their duties or for securities fraud in their 
misleading disclosures. More subtly, directors and officers of  benefit 
corporations are likely to strongly believe that they are doing good, and 
the vague standards of  the statutes will not provide a strong reality check 
against the power of  self-belief.48 
Indeed, slavish adherence to statutory decision-making and 
liability standards may enable benefit corporation directors to ultimately 
avoid liability for their actions.  However, that statutory obedience may 
unduly restrict the field of  vision and focus of  the board and, as a result, 
also may limit director judgment and discretion in ways that could 
handicap the board’s ability to make optimal decisions—decisions that 
benefit shareholders as well as other firm stakeholders.49  The business 
judgment rule was introduced to the judicial review of  management 
decision-making at least in part to allow open-textured decision-
making—risk-taking through the free exercise of  a director’s experienced 
judgment and discretion.50  Professor Steve Bainbridge reinforces this 
notion when he offers that, “[g]iven the significant virtues of  discretion, 
. . . one must not lightly interfere with management or the board’s 
decision-making authority in the name of  accountability. Preservation of  
managerial discretion should always be the null hypothesis.”51 
Even if  benefit corporation directors and officers endeavor to 
strictly observe the statutory constraints on their decision-making, they 
still may be subjected to shareholder claims based on their actions.  This 
litigation may be a lengthy, complex, expensive process.  In a legal action 
for breach of  fiduciary duty, for example, plaintiffs will face many 																																																								
48 Id. at 97 (footnotes omitted). 
49 See Heminway, Corporate Purpose, supra note 31, at 634 (“Under applicable rules in 
some state benefit corporation statutes, the board must consider the effects of  its 
conduct on specific constituencies as well as the corporation’s charter-based public 
benefit or public benefits. This statutory requirement decreases the discretion afforded 
to corporate management (by specifically defining what management must consider) 
and limits the need for and reliance on 
management expertise.” (footnote omitted)). 
50 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (overruled on other grounds 
by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (“The business judgment rule exists to 
protect and promote the full and free exercise of  the managerial power granted to 
Delaware directors.”); Sandra K. Miller, What Standards of  Conduct Should Apply to 
Members and Managers of  Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 21, 41 (1994) 
(“The policy underlying the rule encourages risk taking, innovation, and creative 
entrepreneurial activities.”). 
51 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 83, 109 (2004). 
812 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20 
 
	
hurdles in successfully pleading and proving their claims.  The 
substantive law is new and experimental.  Charter-based exculpation, 
statutory limitations on liability, indemnification, or insurance may be 
available, as well as the protections of  the business judgment rule.52  
With this type of  litigation in mind, I observed in my prior work that 
[t]he immutable rules specific to benefit corporations 
create additional costs—costs associated with, e.g., . . . 
untested structural and governance rules—that may not 
provide a net benefit to shareholders and other investors. 
These costs and attendant litigation risks also cast doubt 
on the aggregate advantages of  benefit corporations to 
other stakeholders. None may feel well protected when 
taking into account the overall effects of  the benefit 
corporation’s unique immutable rules.53 
The costs may be particularly acute for publicly traded social enterprises 
organized as benefit corporations.54 
In light of  the unclear statutory mandates governing benefit 
corporation management decision-making and the possible impact of  
their application in contexts where more open-textured decision-making 
may be more desirable, lawyers representing social enterprises and their 
principals should be aware of  the possibility of  and prospects for both 
litigation and liability that result from benefit corporation director 
decision-making.  Moreover, these lawyers must be able to describe the 
related risks to the directors as accurately and plainly as possible.  In the 
absence of  decisional law, the lawyer must rely on experiential wisdom 
from other contexts to provide the necessary advice. 
This counseling context challenges the lawyer’s advisory and 
communication skills and duties as a matter of  professional 
responsibility.  Legal counsel to social enterprises cannot offer 
unequivocal, wooden legal advice. In this context, “[a]dvice couched in 
narrow legal terms may be of  little value to a client, especially where 
practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are 																																																								
52 See Heminway, Corporate Purpose, supra note 42, at 634. 
As a general matter, assuming a viable fiduciary duty claim, the liability or financial 
responsibility of  corporate directors for breaches of  fiduciary duty may be narrowed 
through the application of  up to four mandatory or permissive aspects 
of  corporate law. These include exculpation for breaches of  the duty of  care, 
indemnification (statutory and privately ordered), director and officer liability insurance, 
and the possible application of  the business judgment rule in the judicial review 
process. Id. (footnote omitted). 
53 Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up, supra note 37, at 798. 
54 See generally Heminway, supra note 41, at 625–45 (2017) (outlining key litigation risks 
for publicly held U.S. benefit corporations). 
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predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be 
inadequate.”55  Consultation, mutuality, and patience are all required to 
ensure effective communication and compliance with the lawyer’s 
applicable professional responsibilities in service to the client.56 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Advising entrepreneurs, founders, promoters, and management 
of  social enterprises can be both satisfying and frustrating.  The 
satisfaction most often comes from helping these businesses achieve 
financial success while also serving the public good.  The frustration 
comes from the difficulty of  the task in providing the necessary 
counsel—both in selecting the optimal legal form for the firm and in 
advising management as the business operates and decisions are made 
over time. These legal advisory contexts involving social enterprises are 
richly textured and immerse legal counsel in multilevel decision-making 
that impacts both internal and external business constituencies.  The 
overall advisory environment implicates, among other things, hortatory 
text in the Preamble to the Model Rules of  Professional Conduct 
providing that “[a] lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of  skill, 
to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal 
profession’s ideals of  public service.”57  In lawyering for social enterprise, 
the legal advisor’s skill and public service responsibilities interact 
meaningfully. 
Said another way, the complex decision-making involved in 
lawyering for social enterprise presents obvious challenges for business 
venturers and their legal counsel that involve not only baseline 
professional responsibility matters of  competence (comprising doctrinal 
knowledge and solid, rational legal analysis), diligence (by offering 
patient and perceptive insights in helping the client to choose from 
among available alternatives), and communication (with the goal of  
ensuring informed client decision-making), but also the exercise of  
appropriate discretion and professionalism that requires the savvy built 
from doctrinal, theoretical, and practical experience and leadership 
capabilities.  As Professor Jeff  Lipshaw has written in his intriguing and 
engaging book Beyond Legal Reasoning: A Critique of  Pure Lawyering, “I am 
firmly convinced that great lawyers . . . bring something more than keen 
analytical skills to the table. They bring some kind of  wisdom—a 
metaphorical creativity—that transcends disciplinary boundaries, both 																																																								
55 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.2.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
56 See id. r. 1.4(a)(2), (b) (requiring reasonable consultation “with the client about the 
means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished” and explanation of   “a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation.”). 
57 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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within the law and without.”58  That brand of  wisdom is especially 
important in the kinds of  questions that arise in lawyering for social 
enterprise. 
Accordingly, as lawyers representing social enterprises, we need 
to develop a sensitivity to the various business models and related facts, 
knowledge of  a complex and novel set of  laws, and well-practiced, 
contextual legal reasoning skills. But that, while necessary, is insufficient 
to the task.  We also must impose judgment borne of  a deep 
understanding of  the nature of  social enterprise and of  our clients and 
their representatives working in that space.  Only then can we fulfill our 
professional promise as legal advisors: to provide clients with both “an 
informed understanding of  . . . legal rights and obligations” and an 
explanation of  “their practical implications.”59 
																																																								
58 JEFFREY LIPSHAW, BEYOND LEGAL REASONING: A CRITIQUE OF PURE LAWYERING 
163 (2017).  Profesor Alicia Plerhoples makes a similar point in the social enterprise 
representation context when she observes that “[l]awyers encounter unstructured legal 
problems throughout their careers; the competent or expert lawyer is able to apply their 
knowledge, skills, practice judgment, and method of  practice to resolve their clients' 
unstructured problems.”  Alicia E. Plerhoples, supra note 1, at 255. 
59 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).	
